Token-based payment processing system

ABSTRACT

A data-processing system, such as a payment processing system, including a tokenizer, such as a card encryption and storage system (CES) employing a tokenization feature. In one embodiment, the present invention provides a first-computer-implemented method for preventing the transmission of confidential information between a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer. The method includes the steps of: (a) the first computer receiving information for performing a transaction, the information including confidential information manually entered by a user; (b) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer; (c) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token having no algorithmic relationship to the confidential information; and (d) the first computer sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/167,221, filed Apr. 7, 2009, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to the introduction, storage, and use of confidential information in corporate enterprise systems, and, more specifically but not exclusively, to the use of tokens as substitutes for confidential information in such systems.

2. Description of the Related Art

The payment-card industry (PCI), in response to the growing theft of payment-card data resulting from inadequate information technology security, has had an evolving set of security standards. Initially, the payment-application best-practices (PABP) guidelines promulgated by the industry required merchants to encrypt card numbers.

Limitations in the PABP guidelines resulted in the September, 2006 release of version 1.1 of the PCI Data-Security Standard (DSS) and the related PCI Security-Audit Procedures. These programs required more than mere encryption and mandated compliance in order to process payment-card transactions. Under these programs, merchants are required to document their compliance with the DSS, depending on their annual volumes. The largest merchants must undergo an on-site audit to verify merchant and processor compliance. Medium-sized and smaller merchants are permitted to complete a self-assessment, attesting that various security features and programs have been implemented.

According to the DSS standards, cardholder data is defined as any clear or encrypted primary account number (PAN). The DSS standards declare that any system that “processes, stores, or transmits” cardholder data, as well as any system on the same network segment (i.e., one of a plurality of a subnetworks making up a corporate network), must comply with the requirements of the DSS standards.

Additionally, certain personally-identifiable information (PII) may also give rise to regulatory scrutiny, e.g., by federal law or the laws of individual states in the United States. The term PII refers to information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single individual. For example, in a 2007 memorandum from the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the U.S. Government defined PII information as: “Information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, etc.”

Similarly, in the European Union, Article 2a of EU directive 95/46/EC defines “personal data” as meaning “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”

Likewise, “personal information” is defined in a section of the California data breach notification law, SB1386, as meaning “an individual's first name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted: (1) social security number; (2) driver's license number or California Identification Card number; (3) account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account.”

Compliance with DSS standards and other regulatory requirements of various jurisdictions typically requires that all computer systems involved in the processing of unencrypted sensitive data, such as PCI and PII data, and possibly including an entire corporate data center, be compliant with such standards and requirements. The cost of compliance, as well as the cost of verifying compliance, can be substantial, both operationally and financially.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Problems in the prior art are addressed in accordance with the principles of the present invention by providing a data-processing system, such as a payment processing system, including a tokenizer, such as a card encryption and storage system (CES) employing a tokenization feature. With tokenization, rather than entering confidential information, such as a payment-card account number, into an application module, such as an enterprise resource-planning (ERP) system (e.g., SAP ERP), the confidential information is instead captured and stored within the tokenizer prior to being sent to the application module. The tokenizer then returns a random string called a “token” to the calling application as a pointer to the original payment-card number. The token preferably has no algorithmic relationship with the original payment-card number, so that the payment-card number cannot be derived based on the token itself (such as by merely applying a decryption algorithm to the token). Accordingly, this token is not considered cardholder data, because it is a random string from which it is not possible to extrapolate any original cardholder data without the use of the tokenizer, which contains a list of payment-card numbers and the tokens to which they correspond. As such, the token may be used in an application module without the application module having to comply with regulatory standards, e.g., the PCI DSS standards.

Under the PCI DSS regulatory scheme, if cardholder data (including any clear or encrypted payment-card account number) is present in an application module, either alone or together with a cardholder name, service code, and/or expiration date, then the application module is within the scope of regulatory scrutiny. Accordingly, if cardholder data can be replaced by some other, non-account-number string, then a host application no longer employs cardholder data and is out of the scope of PCI DSS regulatory scrutiny.

In one embodiment, the present invention provides a first-computer-implemented method for preventing the transmission of confidential information between a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer. The method includes the steps of: (a) the first computer receiving information for performing a transaction, the information including confidential information manually entered by a user; (b) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer; (c) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token having no algorithmic relationship to the confidential information; and (d) the first computer sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.

In another embodiment, the present invention provides an apparatus for preventing the transmission of confidential information to a second computer in communication with the apparatus. The apparatus is adapted to: (a) receive information for performing a transaction, the information including confidential information manually entered by a user; (b) send the confidential information to a third computer; (c) receive, from the third computer, a token having no algorithmic relationship to the confidential information; and (d) send to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.

In a further embodiment, the present invention provides a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, having encoded thereon program code, wherein, when the program code is executed by a machine, the machine implements a method for preventing the transmission of confidential information from a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer. The method includes the steps of: (a) the first computer receiving information for performing a transaction, the information including confidential information manually entered by a user; (b) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer; (c) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token having no algorithmic relationship to the confidential information; and (d) the first computer sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.

In yet a further embodiment, the present invention provides a first-computer-implemented method for preventing the transmission of confidential information between a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer. The method includes the steps of: (a) the first computer inspecting an entry field of a window of a software program to determine whether the entry field includes confidential information; (b) if the entry field includes confidential information, then (b1) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer, and (b2) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token having no algorithmic relationship to the confidential information; and (c) the first computer replacing the confidential information in the entry field of the window of the software program with the token.

In still a further embodiment, the present invention provides a first-computer-implemented method for preventing the transmission of confidential information between a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer. The method includes the steps of: (a) the first computer receiving one or more packets of data from the first computer; (b) the first computer inspecting the one or more packets of data to determine whether the one or more packets of data include confidential information; (b) if the one or more packets of data include confidential information, then (b1) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer, and (b2) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token having no algorithmic relationship to the confidential information; (c) the first computer modifying the one or more packets of data by replacing the confidential information in the one or more packets of data with the token; and (d) the first computer forwarding the one or more modified packets of data to the second computer.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Other aspects, features, and advantages of the present invention will become more fully apparent from the following detailed description, the appended claims, and the accompanying drawings in which like reference numerals identify similar or identical elements.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram depicting a first exemplary payment-processing system with tokenization in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 2 is a flow chart showing an exemplary algorithm for a token application in one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 3 is a flow chart showing an exemplary algorithm for a desktop token interface in one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 4 is a flow chart showing an exemplary algorithm for an alternative embodiment of a desktop token interface in one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 5 is a block diagram depicting a second exemplary payment-processing system with tokenization in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 6 is a flow chart showing an exemplary algorithm for a packet inspector in one embodiment of the invention;

FIGS. 7 a-7 e collectively show exemplary program code for implementing the algorithm of FIG. 3;

FIGS. 8 a-c collectively show exemplary program code for implementing the algorithm of FIG. 4; and

FIGS. 9 a-c collectively show exemplary program code for implementing the algorithm of FIG. 6.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 depicts a first exemplary payment-processing system 100 with tokenization, consistent with one embodiment of the invention. In this embodiment, system 100 includes a tokenizer 120, a web store 110, an input module 140, an application module 150, and payment-card middleware 130. Web store 110 is used by a purchaser to make a purchase, and input module 140 is used by a customer-service representative to enter a customer's order. Tokenizer 120 generates tokens from payment-card numbers and provides the tokens to web store 110 and input module 140. Application module 150 is a commercial enterprise system that would conventionally include payment-card numbers but instead uses tokens in place of such payment-card numbers, so that no payment-card number ever enters application module 150. Payment-card middleware 130 receives settlement requests from application module 150 in tokenized form, retrieves corresponding payment-card numbers from tokenizer 120, and forwards the settlement requests in “clear-card” form (i.e., the numeric value of the card number appearing on the physical card itself) to clearing house 160, which effects the actual payment transactions.

Whether payment-card data is entered through web store 110 or through input module 140, by tokenizing before capture, tokenizer 120 protects and isolates cardholder data by providing tokens for downstream processing, which prevents application module 150 from being subject to regulatory scrutiny.

Payment-processing system 100 is compliant with, e.g., the PCI DSS standards, which require that “in-scope” systems (i.e., systems falling within the scope of regulation of the PCI DSS standards) be isolated from the rest of the corporate network, e.g., via a firewall. The DSS standards also require that public Internet-facing web servers be isolated as well. Payment-processing system 100 therefore employs three “in-scope” network segments, or zones, for PCI purposes: (i) a web-server zone including web store 110, (ii) a customer-service zone including input module 140, and (iii) a PCI server zone including tokenizer 120 and payment-card middleware 130. Achieving and maintaining PCI compliance using these three well-defined and limited network segments and their corresponding functionality can be considerably simpler and more manageable to implement than remediating or modifying large sections of a corporate network.

Tokenizer

Tokenizer 120 includes one or more computers containing a token database 122 and a token application 124. Token database 122, may be implemented using, e.g., a simple look-up table or a more complex database system, such as Oracle Database 10g available from Oracle Corporation of Redwood City, Calif. Token database 122 contains encrypted payment-card numbers, along with a corresponding token for each encrypted payment-card number in the database.

Token application 124 encrypts payment-card numbers as they are received and generates random tokens corresponding to those payment-card numbers. In one embodiment, a payment-card number having a value of “371449635398183” might have a corresponding token with a randomly-generated alphanumeric string value of “Nc4xWKms.” In another embodiment, part of the token might contain part of the payment-card number, e.g., such that the payment card type (first two digits of the payment-card number, where “37” represents American Express, “40” represents Visa, and “54” represents Mastercard) and last four digits of the card are actually part of the token itself, to assist customers and customer-service representatives in confirming or identifying, generally, the card corresponding to the token. For example, a payment-card number having a value of “371449635398183” might have a corresponding token with a value of “37-Nc4xWKms-8183,” where (i) the first two digits, “37,” identify the card as being of type American Express, (ii) the middle portion of the token is a randomly-generated alphanumeric string, and (iii) the last four digits, “8183,” are usable to confirm the card number with the cardholder, if necessary.

Token application 124 is desirably implemented as a Java application, so that it can execute on any platform with the Java Runtime Environment (from Sun Microsystems, Inc. of Santa Clara, Calif.) installed. For most workloads (e.g., under 10 million payment-card transactions per year), token application 124 preferably executes on a machine such as the SunFire 4100 from Sun Microsystems, Inc., System x3650 from IBM Corporation of Armonk, N.Y., or Poweredge 2950 from Dell, Inc. of Round Rock, Tex.

Token application 124 interfaces with token database 122 to write information to token database 122, e.g., to write an encrypted payment-card number and corresponding newly-generated token as a new entry in token database 122. In one embodiment, a table stored in token database 122 might contain a table with entries such as the following payment-card number/token pairs:

PAYMENT-CARD NUMBER CORRESPONDING TOKEN 371449635398183 37-Nc4xWKms-8183 371449635398290 37-waPaPcx6-8290 4012000033330232 40-sdkKXnO8-0232 4012000033330497 40-dTXeX5NN-0497 5424180279790213 54-9HcfZNH2-0213 5424180279790494 54-2CZYVkSt-0494

Token application 124 also interfaces with token database 122 to read information from token database 122, e.g., to retrieve a payment-card number based on a given token, or to retrieve a token for a payment-card number that has already been stored. Token application 124 further interfaces, using a secure-socket layer (SSL) protocol, with one or both of web store 110 and input module 140, e.g., to respond to a request to generate a new token or retrieve a previously-generated token from token database 122 based on a payment-card number. Token application 124 further interfaces with payment-card middleware 130, e.g., to respond to a request to retrieve a payment-card number based on a supplied token.

It is desirable that multiple instances of token application 124 execute in parallel within tokenizer 120, to provide redundancy and stability, and it is further desirable that at least two instances of token application 124 be running full-time, one in a primary location and one in a backup location (e.g., on different computers/processors). Likewise, token database 122 is desirably stored in more than a single location to provide redundancy, and tokenizer 120 may therefore include a primary database server in the primary location, which is backed up by a recovery database server in the backup location.

For interfacing with source applications, such as web sites and related applications (e.g., web store 110), tokenizer 120 employs (i) either a hyper-text transport protocol (HTTP) or secure-HTTP (HTTPS) socket interface, in conjunction with (ii) an SSL socket interface. In this scenario, tokenizer 120 uses two different APIs corresponding to these two interfaces, respectively: (i) an HTTP API, e.g., for communicating name-value pairs (e.g., MIME Type URL Form Encoded, such as “action=CE&data=1234123412341234”), and (ii) a socket API communicating in a fixed format, e.g., “FF0027CE01bbbbbbb1234123412341234,” where the character “b” represents a blank. In both cases, SSL is used to encrypt the transmission. The reason for having two APIs is that the HTTP protocol uses a socket setup/teardown procedure for each transaction, whereas a socket connection is persistent across many transactions and is therefore more suitable for high-volume interactions, such as with payment-card middleware 130, which needs to detokenize many transactions in short timeframes.

A single request-response call from web store 110 sends the payment-card number in clear-card form to tokenizer 120 and receives a corresponding token from tokenizer 120 before passing the tokenized transaction along to application module 150.

With reference now to FIG. 2, an exemplary algorithm 200 for token application 124 will now be described. The algorithm is instantiated at step 201. Next, at step 202, token application 124 waits to receive an input string from a calling module, e.g., one or more of web store 110, input module 140, and payment-card middleware 130. Next, at step 203, an input string is received from the calling module. Next, at step 204, a determination is made whether the input string is a payment-card number or a token. If, at step 204, it is determined that the input string is a payment-card number, then token application 124 proceeds to step 205. If, at step 204, it is determined that the input string is a token, then token application 124 proceeds to step 206.

At step 205, a search of token database 122 is performed to determine whether the payment-card number already exists in the database. If, at step 205, it is determined that the payment-card number does not already exist in the database, then token application 124 proceeds to step 209. If, at step 205, it is determined that the payment-card number already exists in the database, then token application 124 proceeds to step 211.

At step 209, token application 124 generates a token, which is desirably a random alphanumeric string. This alphanumeric string is not generated, in any way, based on the payment-card number and does not have any algorithmic relationship to the payment-card number. Accordingly, the token cannot be later be used to generate the payment-card number without the use of tokenizer 120.

Next, at step 210, token application 124 stores the payment-card number in encrypted form, together with the token, in token database 122. Next, at step 212, token application 124 outputs the token to the calling module and then returns to step 202.

At step 211, the token corresponding to the payment-card number is retrieved from token database 122, and then the algorithm proceeds to step 212.

At step 206, a search of token database 122 is performed to determine whether the token exists in the database. If, at step 206, it is determined that the token does not exist in the database, then token application 124 returns to step 202. If, at step 206, it is determined that the token does already exist in the database, then token application 124 proceeds to step 207. At step 207, the payment-card number corresponding to the token is retrieved from token database 122. Next, at step 208, token application 124 outputs the payment-card number to the calling module and then returns to step 202.

The PCI DSS provisions require that applications be separated from database functions. Thus, compliance with the DSS standards involves a minimum configuration of four computer systems: an application system and a database system in the primary location, along with another pair of such systems in the backup location. Because tokenizer 120 can be adapted to function properly using only generic user privileges, other payment-card applications can also be hosted on these four computer systems.

In an alternative embodiment, token application 124 is a payment-card middleware application (e.g., in lieu of payment-card middleware 130) and resides on an isolated network segment so as to be compliant with, e.g., PCI DSS requirements.

Payment-Card Number Input

Payment-processing system 100 employs two different possibly sources of payment-card information: (i) public Internet-facing web sites and related applications implementing shopping card, one-time pay, or account-maintenance functions, and (ii) customer-service call centers or physical points of sale, where end customers provide cardholder data to customer-service representatives, who enter the cardholder data. Accordingly, payment-processing system 100 includes both a web store 100 and an input module 140 to achieve this functionality. In alternative embodiments, only one of web store 100 and input module 140 might be provided.

Web store 110 includes one or more computers containing an application used by an end user (e.g., a consumer making a purchase from an online web merchant) to purchase one or more goods and/or services. During the payment portion of a purchase transaction, web store 110 employs an application-programming interface (API) to transmit a payment-card number to tokenizer 120, which returns a token for web store 110 to send to application module 150 along with other transaction data.

Input module 140 includes one or more computers containing an order-taking application interface, e.g., SAP graphical user interface (SAP GUI), or other software used by a customer-service representative to enter customer data. The customer-service representative uses input module 140, e.g., to take an order by phone or in person at a physical point of sale. Input module 140 includes a desktop token interface 145, which interfaces with tokenizer 120. Desktop token interface 145 transmits a payment-card number to tokenizer 120, which returns a token for input module 140 to send to application module 150 along with other transaction data.

Input module 140 is desirably implemented in a customer-service workstation of a customer-service center. Desktop token interface 145 is an application (e.g., a Microsoft Windows applet written in the Visual Basic programming language) into which a customer-service representative manually enters a customer's payment-card number (e.g., by typing). Desktop token interface 145 uses an application-programming interface (API) to send the payment-card number in clear-card form to tokenizer 120, which encrypts and stores the payment-card number in token database 122 and returns to desktop token interface 145 a token corresponding to the card number. Desktop token interface 145 then saves the token to the Windows clipboard (although a buffer other than an operating-system clipboard could alternatively be used to achieve similar functionality in other embodiments), thus allowing a single-key or mouse-click “paste” operation to enter the token into the relevant entry-screen field within input module 140. Accordingly, with only about four additional key strokes or mouse clicks (i.e., in addition to the customer data-entry operations ordinarily being performed), a customer-service representative can use desktop token interface 145 to tokenize a payment-card number.

With reference now to FIG. 3, an exemplary algorithm 300 for desktop token interface 145 will now be described. At step 301, the applet is instantiated. Next, at step 302, the applet waits in the background for a predefined keystroke (e.g., ALT-F12) to be pressed. This keystroke will be pressed by a customer-service representative using the order-taking software running on input module 140 to effect a purchase of goods or services, at the moment the customer-service representative is ready to enter a customer's payment-card number. Instead of entering the payment-card number directly into the order-taking software (such that the order-taking software would be subject to regulatory compliance), the customer-service representative uses the predefined keystroke to activate the applet.

Next, at step 303, a relatively small entry window is displayed on the screen of the customer-service representative (e.g., on top of or adjacent to the order-taking software window). It is desirable that the entry window contain only a single input field. The window might also contain a clickable “submit” button. The customer-service representative types a customer's payment-card number into the input field of the entry window and presses the Enter key (or clicks the “submit” button, if one is provided).

Next, at step 304, the customer's payment-card number is received, in clear-card form, from the input field of the entry window. Next, at step 305, a determination is made whether the payment-card number entered is a valid card number using, e.g., a Luhn check (also called a Mod 10 check). If, at step 305, it is determined that the card number is invalid, then, at step 306, an error message is displayed on the screen of the customer-service representative, and the applet returns to step 302. If, at step 305, it is determined that the card number is valid, then the algorithm proceeds to step 307.

At step 307, a tokenization request containing the payment-card number is sent via an encrypted socket using the HTTPS protocol to tokenizer 120, which returns a token corresponding to the payment-card number. Next, at step 308, the token is received from tokenizer 120. Next, at step 309, the token is copied to the Windows OS clipboard. The token may also be displayed on the screen to confirm to the customer-service representative that the tokenization was successful. Following step 309, the applet returns to step 302. At this point, the token has been stored in the Windows OS clipboard.

Next, the customer-service representative changes application focus from the applet window to the order-taking software window. (It is noted that this may not be necessary in certain embodiments in which the applet closes the entry window once a token has been generated, because the application focus automatically returns to the order-taking software window upon closure of the applet's entry window.) The customer-service representative then pastes the token from the Windows OS clipboard into the payment-card number field of the order-taking software. This can be done, for example, using a sequence of mouse controls (e.g., right-click, then selecting “Paste” from a drop-down menu) or keystroke (e.g., CTRL-V). The customer-service representative then submits the order to application module 150 for processing, e.g., by pressing a “send” button on a screen of the order-taking software window.

In the foregoing manner, at no point does the payment-card number in clear-card form ever enter application module 150, and application module 150 is therefore not subject to regulatory scrutiny.

Further details are provided in FIGS. 7 a-7 e, which show exemplary Visual Basic program code for implementing algorithm 300 of FIG. 3.

One exemplary algorithm 300 in one embodiment of desktop token interface 145 has been described above, in which a customer-service representative manually requests a token from tokenizer 120 and then, before initiating a clearing-house transaction, manually pastes the token into a field within input module 140 that would conventionally be filled with a payment-card number in clear-card form. In an alternative embodiment that will now be described, desktop token interface 145 automatically extracts a payment-card number in clear-card form that was entered by a customer-service representative into a field within input module 140, requests a token from tokenizer 120, and replaces the clear-card form payment-card number with the token, all before initiating a clearing-house transaction.

With reference now to FIG. 4, an exemplary algorithm 400 for an alternative embodiment of desktop token interface 145 will now be described. Instead of being embodied in a Windows applet as in the case of algorithm 300, algorithm 400 is embodied in a script. For example, the SAP ERP software employs a Windows application front-end interface called SAP GUI, which provides a method for SAP customers to develop their own scripts to extend the functionality of SAP ERP. Accordingly, algorithm 400 is desirably implemented as a SAP GUI script within input module 140.

In this scenario, a customer-service representative uses the SAP GUI order-taking application interface running on input module 140 to effect a purchase of goods or services. The customer-service representative takes the customer's order and enters all of the relevant order information, including a customer's payment-card number, into a standard order screen (e.g., the VA01 Create Sales Order screen). After entering all of the information, the customer-service representative presses the “Save” icon on the standard order screen. Normally, pressing “Save” would cause all of the information on the order screen, including any payment-card numbers in clear-card form, to be submitted to an application module for processing, which would subject the application module to regulatory scrutiny. However, in this embodiment, the SAP GUI script is configured so that pressing “Save” instantiates the script that implements algorithm 400 before any information is sent to application module 150.

At step 401, the script is instantiated. Next, at step 402, the script searches all fields present on the standard order-screen form for one or more fields labeled CCNUM (or uses other criteria to locate fields that contain payment-card numbers in clear-card form) to determine whether the order-screen form contains any fields populated with payment-card numbers. If, at step 402, it is determined that the order-screen form has no fields that contain payment-card numbers in clear-card form, then the script proceeds to step 405, at which an error message is displayed on the screen of the customer-service representative, and the script subsequently exits with an error condition at step 410. If, at step 402, it is determined that the order-screen form has fields that contain payment-card numbers in clear-card form, then the script proceeds to step 403.

At step 403, the script reads the payment-card number in clear-card form from the field of the order-screen form. Next, at step 404, a determination is made whether the payment-card number entered is a valid card number using, e.g., a Luhn check (also called a Mod 10 check). If, at step 404, it is determined that the card number is invalid, then, at step 405, an error message is displayed on the screen of the customer-service representative, and the script subsequently exits with an error condition at step 410. If, at step 404, it is determined that the card number is valid, then the algorithm proceeds to step 406.

At step 406, a tokenization request containing the payment-card number is sent via an encrypted socket using the HTTPS protocol to tokenizer 120, which returns a token corresponding to the payment-card number.

Next, at step 407, the token is received from tokenizer 120. Next, at step 408, the script removes the payment-card number in clear-card form from the field of the order-screen form and replaces it with the received token.

Next, at step 409, a determination is made whether there are additional payment-card numbers on the order-screen form, in which case the script returns to step 403 to process the next payment-card number found on the order-screen form. Otherwise, the script proceeds to step 411.

At step 411, the script submits all of the information on the order-screen form, including tokens that replace the payment-card numbers in clear-card form, to application module 150. Next, at step 412, the script exits with a success condition.

If the script exits with an error condition at step 410, then the customer-service representative is taken back to the order-entry screen to make corrections, e.g., supplying a missing payment-card number or correcting an invalid payment-card number. Once appropriate correction has been made, the customer-service representative can then press “save” to retry, and algorithm 400 is once again instantiated.

In the foregoing manner, it is not necessary for the customer-service representative to manually activate an applet or paste a token into any application (as in the case of algorithm 300), and the entire tokenization process can occur seamlessly and in the background without any special knowledge or actions on the part of the customer-service representative.

Further details are provided in FIGS. 8 a-8 c, which show exemplary SAP GUI program code for implementing algorithm 400 of FIG. 4.

Application Module

Application module 150 is a commercial enterprise system including one or more computers containing software adapted to handle sales orders, delivery tracking, billing, account settlement, and related functionality, e.g., a system including mySAP™ Business Suite software available from SAP Americas, located in Newtown Square, Pa. Application module 150 receives from web store 110 tokenized web transactions, e.g., by means of an API capable of accessing functionality within application module 150 (such as SAP Business Application Programming Interface (BAPI)). Alternatively or additionally, application module 150 receives from input module 140 tokenized customer service transactions and account updates, e.g., by means of a universal client interface (e.g., SAP GUI) within input module 140, which is capable of accessing functionality within application module 150. Application module 150 sends tokenized requests for authorization and settlement to payment-card middleware 130 and receives from application module 150 tokenized responses to those requests, e.g., by means of a standard interface for communication with application module 150 (such as SAP Remote Function Call (RFC)).

It should be understood that application module 150 does not process, transmit, or store any PCI or PII data and is therefore not subject to regulatory scrutiny. The transactions that take place between application module 150 and web store 110 and/or input module 140 are all in tokenized form and do not include any PCI or PII data. Similarly, authorization and settlement transactions between application module 150 and payment-card middleware 130 are also in tokenized form and do not include any PCI or PII data. This scheme may be referred to as a “tokenize-before-capture” approach, whereby all front-end sources of entry for payment-card accounts (e.g., web store 110 and input module 140) are configured to tokenize the clear-card form of the payment-card number before passing the transaction along to back-end systems (e.g., application module 150) for processing.

Payment-Card Middleware

Payment-card middleware 130 includes one or more computers containing software that receives and responds to the tokenized authorization and settlement requests from application module 150, with each request including a supplied token for which the corresponding payment-card number is to be retrieved from token database 122. Payment-card middleware 130 interfaces with tokenizer 120 via an SSL interface to send requests for detokenization using the supplied token and to receive responses to those requests in the form of a payment-card number in clear-card form. Payment-card middleware 130 interfaces, e.g., via SSL or private lines, with a clearing house 160, e.g., the Automated Clearing House (ACH) payment system, to provide a clearing-house transaction request that includes the clear-card form payment-card number, for the purpose of effecting the actual payment transaction.

Payment-card middleware 130 may include card-processing software, such as PPS PayWare™ available from Princeton Payment Solutions of Princeton, N.J. Embodiments of payment-card middleware 130 may be token-aware, i.e., may be configured to distinguish automatically between tokens and payment-card numbers in clear-card form. In this manner, if a settlement request contains a payment-card number in clear-card form, then payment-card middleware 130 provides the clearing-house transaction request to clearing house 160 without using tokenizer 120. If, however, a settlement request contains a token instead of a payment-card number, then payment-card middleware 130 first uses tokenizer 120 to obtain the corresponding payment-card number prior to providing the clearing-house transaction request to clearing house 160. Accordingly, payment-card middleware 130 can be used as middleware for processing both tokenized transactions and non-tokenized transactions (e.g., from applications other than application module 150).

Bulk Data Migration

In addition to having utility for payment-card data entry and processing at a point of sale, embodiments of payment-processing system 100 can also be used to migrate bulk cardholder data stored in commercial enterprise system tables (e.g., the SAP BSEGC or FPLTC tables) to tokenizer 120. In this scenario, one or more modules of tokenizer 120 (e.g., payment-card middleware 130) are provided with software to effect such data migration. Migration is desirably performed while no active payment transactions are taking place (to avoid locked payment-card entries in the source table), but this is not a requirement, and the migration routine can be performed one or more additional times to ensure the migration of table entries locked during previous runs of the migration routine. If payment-card middleware 130 is configured to distinguish automatically between tokens and payment-card numbers in clear-card form and automatically return one when the other is supplied, as described above, then a migration to tokens can be performed with minimal commercial enterprise system downtime.

Packet Inspector

With reference now to FIGS. 5 and 6, a second exemplary payment-processing system 500 consistent with one embodiment of the invention will now be described. Payment-processing system 500 is similar to payment-processing system 100, except as described below.

FIG. 5 depicts payment-processing system 500 with tokenization, consistent with one embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG. 5, instead of employing a desktop token interface, payment-processing system 500 initiates tokenization using a packet inspector 545, e.g., the BIG-IP™ Local Traffic Manager or BIG-IP™ Global Traffic Manager, both available from F5 Networks, Inc. of Seattle, Wash. In payment-processing system 500, all packets (e.g., TCP/IP packets) from input module 540 pass through packet inspector 545 prior to being forwarded to application module 550. Packet inspector 545 is adapted to modify the contents of certain packets prior to forwarding them, as will be now described in further detail.

Packet inspector 545 receives packets containing transactions in non-tokenized form from input module 540, inspects each incoming packet for payment-card numbers in clear-card form, and tokenizes those payment-card numbers prior to passing the packet along to application module 550. Packet inspector 545 tokenizes the payment-card numbers by sending the payment-card numbers in clear-card form to tokenizer 520, which encrypts and stores the payment-card numbers in token database 522 and returns to packet inspector 545 a token corresponding to the card number. Packet inspector 545 replaces the clear-card form payment-card numbers found in packets passing through packet inspector 545 with tokens prior to sending those packets to application module 550, so that packets containing transactions that are sent to application module 550 contain only tokenized transactions.

With reference now to FIG. 6, an exemplary algorithm 600 for packet inspector 545 will now be described. Algorithm 600 is desirably embodied in a script running on packet inspector 545, e.g., a tool command language (TCL) script used in conjunction with the BIG-IP product series from F5 Networks, Inc. TCL scripts have access to all traffic passing through packet inspector 545 and have the ability to inspect and alter any data passing through packet inspector 545.

At step 601, the script is instantiated. Next, at step 602, a packet arriving at packet inspector 545 is received. Next, at step 603, the script inspects the packet to determine whether the referring page from which the packet originated is a “target” web page, which is a web page that is known or expected to request a payment-card number from a customer-service representative. This is done by comparing the Referrer field (which indicates the web page from which the packet originated) in the HTTP header with a list of known target web pages. If, at step 603, it is determined that the packet is not from a target web page, then the script returns to step 602 to receive the next packet. If, at step 603, it is determined that the packet is from a target web page, then the script proceeds to step 604. At step 604, the script inspects the packet to determine whether a field named CCNUM exists (or uses other criteria to locate fields that contain payment-card numbers in clear-card form), the presence of which indicates that the packet contains at least one field populated with a payment-card number. If, at step 604, it is determined that the packet has no fields that contain payment-card numbers in clear-card form, then the script returns to step 602 to receive the next packet. If, at step 604, it is determined that the packet has fields that contain payment-card numbers in clear-card form, then the script proceeds to step 605.

At step 605, the script reads the payment-card number in clear-card form from the field of the packet. Next, at step 606, a determination is made whether the payment-card number is a valid card number using, e.g., a Luhn check (also called a Mod 10 check). If, at step 606, it is determined that the card number is invalid, then there is no actual card number that needs to be tokenized, and the script returns to step 602 to receive the next packet. If, at step 606, it is determined that the card number is valid, then, at step 607, a tokenization request containing the payment-card number is sent via an encrypted socket using the HTTPS protocol to tokenizer 520, which returns a token corresponding to the payment-card number.

Next, at step 608, the token is received from tokenizer 520. Next, at step 609, the script removes the payment-card number in clear-card form from the field of the packet and replaces it with the received token.

Next, at step 610, a determination is made whether there are additional payment-card numbers in the packet, in which case the script returns to step 605 to process the next payment-card number found in the packet. Otherwise, the script proceeds to step 611.

At step 611, the modified packet, including tokens that replace the payment-card numbers in clear-card form, is sent to application module 150, after which the script returns to step 602.

Further details are provided in FIGS. 9 a-9 c, which show exemplary TCL program code for implementing algorithm 600 of FIG. 6.

Alternative Embodiments and Variations

It should be understood that various changes in the details, materials, and arrangements of the parts which have been described and illustrated in order to explain the nature of this invention may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the invention as expressed in the following claims.

For example, it should be understood that the inventive concepts of embodiments of the invention may be applied not only in payment-processing systems as described above but also in any other systems involving the use of confidential information.

Accordingly, although the embodiments described herein are generally in the context of a payment-processing system that uses tokens as a substitute for payment-card numbers, it should be understood that the present invention includes the use of tokens as substitutes for other information desirably kept separate from one or more applications, even outside the context of payment-processing systems, e.g., medical records management systems, age-verification systems that use driver's licenses, etc. Such information can include payment-card numbers and other payment-related information, e.g., bank account numbers, credit or debit card numbers, security codes, access codes, and passwords, as well as other identifying information, e.g., first and/or last names, social security numbers, driver's license numbers, government-issued or school-issued identification numbers, biometric records, birth dates and places, mother's maiden name, etc., and it should be understood that the term “confidential information” as used herein encompasses all of the foregoing, as well as other information desirably kept separate from one or more applications, computers, or computer systems. Likewise, the term “transaction” should be understood as encompassing all transactions that employ confidential information, including, e.g., medical-insurance transactions (such as might be used by a medical provider to bill a patient's insurance company), age-verification transactions (such as might be used to verify the age of a patron ordering alcoholic beverages using a driver's license), transactions for identifying individuals (such as social security number verification systems), and the like.

Conventionally, when encryption is used to protect data representing confidential information, the resulting encrypted string or number is often larger than the data representing the original confidential information. In the case of ERP applications that restrict the size and/or type of data, such as a social security number, to a predetermined format, the process of encryption can result in a value larger that the field allotted, thereby making it difficult or impossible to re-introduce the encrypted value back into the original field. However, because a tokenizer consistent with embodiments of the invention uses tokens having a predefined format as a substitution for confidential information, tokens can be generated that conform with a predefined field length or type. For example, if the confidential information being tokenized is a social security number, which is limited to 9 numeric characters, then a random token having 9 numeric characters can be generated in place of an actual social security number, so that the token can be used in the original social security number field. Thus, using tokens in embodiments of the invention permits a predefined and formatted value substitution with conventional software applications, while exempting those software applications from regulatory scrutiny.

It should be understood that the term “random,” as used herein, should not be construed as being limited to pure random selections or pure random character and/or number generations, but should be understood to include pseudo-randomly-generated alphanumeric strings, including seed-based selections or alphanumeric generations, as well as other selection or character/number generation methods that might simulate randomness but are not purely random. A hashing function might be used in embodiments of the present invention, and such hashing function may be based on random numbers, non-random numbers, or combinations of random and non-random numbers, provided that the hashing function is not based on confidential information itself. The term “random” should also be construed as including other non-random alphanumeric sequences, provided that such sequences have no algorithmic relationship with any confidential information to which such sequences correspond.

The term “packet inspector” as used herein refers to any combination of hardware and/or software used to receive packets of data, examine the contents of those packets, selectively modify the contents of those packets, and forward those packets to other hardware and/or software systems for further processing. In certain embodiments, a packet inspector is implemented purely in software and may reside on a general-purpose computer (e.g., the same computer as input module 540) or other computing device, and in other embodiments, a packet inspector may be a separate, dedicated hardware packet-inspection appliance. A packet inspector as used in embodiments of the invention may also include other functionality, e.g., load-balancing or fail-over protection.

As used herein, the term “module” refers to any of an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a processor (shared, dedicated, or group) that executes one or more software or firmware programs, a combinational logic circuit, and/or other suitable components that provide the described functionality

The present invention can be embodied in the form of methods and apparatuses for practicing those methods. The present invention can also be embodied in the form of program code embodied in tangible media, such as magnetic recording media, optical recording media, solid state memory, floppy diskettes, CD-ROMs, hard drives, or any other non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, wherein, when the program code is loaded into and executed by a machine, such as a computer, the machine becomes an apparatus for practicing embodiments of the invention. The present invention can also be embodied in the form of program code, for example, stored in a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium including being loaded into and/or executed by a machine, wherein, when the program code is loaded into and executed by a machine, such as a computer, the machine becomes an apparatus for practicing embodiments of the invention. When implemented on a general-purpose processor, the program code segments combine with the processor to provide a unique device that operates analogously to specific logic circuits.

The present invention can also be embodied in the form of a bitstream or other sequence of signal values stored in a non-transitory recording medium generated using a method and/or an apparatus of the present invention.

It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that although the functional components of the exemplary embodiments of the system of the present invention described herein may be embodied as one or more distributed computer program processes, data structures, dictionaries and/or other stored data on one or more conventional general purpose computers (e.g., IBM-compatible, Apple Macintosh, and/or RISC microprocessor-based computers), mainframes, minicomputers, conventional telecommunications (e.g., modem, T1, fiber-optic line, DSL, satellite and/or ISDN communications), memory storage means (e.g., RAM, ROM) and storage devices (e.g., computer-readable memory, disk array, direct access storage) networked together by conventional network hardware and software (e.g., LAN/WAN network backbone systems and/or Internet), other types of computers and network resources may be used without departing from the present invention. One or more networks discussed herein may be a local area network, wide area network, internet, intranet, extranet, proprietary network, virtual private network, a TCP/IP-based network, a wireless network (e.g., IEEE 802.11 or Bluetooth), an e-mail based network of e-mail transmitters and receivers, a modem-based, cellular, or mobile telephonic network, an interactive telephonic network accessible to users by telephone, or a combination of one or more of the foregoing.

Embodiments of the invention as described herein may be implemented in one or more computers residing on a network transaction server system, and input/output access to embodiments of the invention may include appropriate hardware and software (e.g., personal and/or mainframe computers provisioned with Internet wide area network communications hardware and software (e.g., CQI-based, FTP, Netscape Navigator™, Mozilla Firefox™, Microsoft Internet Explorer™, or Apple Safari™ HTML Internet-browser software, and/or direct real-time or near-real-time TCP/IP interfaces accessing real-time TCP/IP sockets) for permitting human users to send and receive data, or to allow unattended execution of various operations of embodiments of the invention, in real-time and/or batch-type transactions. Likewise, the system of the present invention may include one or more remote Internet-based servers accessible through conventional communications channels (e.g., conventional telecommunications, broadband communications, wireless communications) using conventional browser software (e.g., Netscape Navigator™, Mozilla Firefox™, Microsoft Internet Explorer™, or Apple Safari™). Thus, the present invention may be appropriately adapted to include such communication functionality and Internet browsing ability. Additionally, those skilled in the art will recognize that the various components of the server system of the present invention may be remote from one another, and may further include appropriate communications hardware/software and/or LAN/WAN hardware and/or software to accomplish the functionality herein described.

Each of the functional components of the present invention may be embodied as one or more distributed computer-program processes running on one or more conventional general purpose computers networked together by conventional networking hardware and software. Each of these functional components may be embodied by running distributed computer-program processes (e.g., generated using “full-scale” relational database engines such as IBM DB2™, Microsoft SQL Server™, Sybase SQL Server™, or Oracle 10g™ database managers, and/or a JDBC interface to link to such databases) on networked computer systems (e.g., including mainframe and/or symmetrically or massively-parallel computing systems such as the IBM SB2™ or HP 9000™ computer systems) including appropriate mass storage, networking, and other hardware and software for permitting these functional components to achieve the stated function. These computer systems may be geographically distributed and connected together via appropriate wide- and local-area network hardware and software. In one embodiment, data stored in the token database or other program data may be made accessible to the user via standard SQL queries for analysis and reporting purposes.

Primary elements of embodiments of the invention may be server-based and may reside on hardware supporting an operating system such as Microsoft Windows NT/2000™ or UNIX.

Components of a system consistent with embodiments of the invention may include mobile and non-mobile devices. Mobile devices that may be employed in the present invention include personal digital assistant (PDA) style computers, e.g., as manufactured by Apple Computer, Inc. of Cupertino, Calif., or Palm, Inc., of Santa Clara, Calif., and other computers running the Android, Symbian, RIM Blackberry, Palm webOS, or iPhone operating systems, Windows CE™ handheld computers, or other handheld computers (possibly including a wireless modem), as well as wireless, cellular, or mobile telephones (including GSM phones, J2ME and WAP-enabled phones, Internet-enabled phones and data-capable smart phones), one- and two-way paging and messaging devices, laptop computers, etc. Other telephonic network technologies that may be used as potential service channels in a system consistent with embodiments of the invention include 2.5G cellular network technologies such as GPRS and EDGE, as well as 3G technologies such as CDMA1xRTT and WCDMA2000, and 4G technologies. Although mobile devices may be used in embodiments of the invention, non-mobile communications devices are also contemplated by embodiments of the invention, including personal computers, Internet appliances, set-top boxes, landline telephones, etc. Clients may also include a PC that supports Apple Macintosh™, Microsoft Windows 95/98/NT/ME/CE/2000/XP/Vista/7™, a UNIX Motif workstation platform, or other computer capable of TCP/IP or other network-based interaction. In one embodiment, no software other than a web browser may be required on the client platform.

Alternatively, the aforesaid functional components may be embodied by a plurality of separate computer processes (e.g., generated via dBase™, Xbase™, MS Access™ or other “flat file” type database management systems or products) running on IBM-type, Intel Pentium™ or RISC microprocessor-based personal computers networked together via conventional networking hardware and software and including such other additional conventional hardware and software as may be necessary to permit these functional components to achieve the stated functionalities. In this alternative configuration, since such personal computers typically may be unable to run full-scale relational database engines of the types presented above, a non-relational flat file “table” (not shown) may be included in at least one of the networked personal computers to represent at least portions of data stored by a system according to the present invention. These personal computers may run the Unix, Microsoft Windows NT/2000™ or Windows 95/98/NT/ME/CE/2000/XP/Vista/7™ operating systems. The aforesaid functional components of a system according to the present invention may also include a combination of the above two configurations (e.g., by computer program processes running on a combination of personal computers, RISC systems, mainframes, symmetric or parallel computer systems, and/or other appropriate hardware and software, networked together via appropriate wide- and local-area network hardware and software).

A system according to the present invention may also be part of a larger computerized financial transaction system including multi-database or multi-computer systems or “warehouses” wherein other data types, processing systems (e.g., transaction, financial, administrative, statistical, data extracting and auditing, data transmission/reception, and/or accounting support and service systems), and/or storage methodologies may be used in conjunction with those of the present invention to achieve an overall information management, processing, storage, search, statistical and retrieval solution for a particular lock box service provider, e-payment warehouser, biller organization, financial institution, payment system, commercial bank, and/or for a cooperative or network of such systems.

In one embodiment, source code may be written in an object-oriented programming language using relational databases. Such an embodiment may include the use of programming languages such as C++ and toolsets such as Microsoft's .Net™ framework. Other programming languages that may be used in constructing a system according to the present invention include Java, HTML, Perl, UNIX shell scripting, assembly language, Fortran, Pascal, Visual Basic, and QuickBasic. Those skilled in the art will recognize that the present invention may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software.

Accordingly, the term “computer,” as used herein, should be understood to mean a combination of hardware and software components including at least one machine having a processor with appropriate instructions for controlling the processor. The term “computer” can be used to refer to more than a single computing device, e.g., multiple personal computers, or one or more personal computers in conjunction with one or more other devices, such as a router, hub, packet-inspection appliance, firewall, etc.

A system consistent with the present invention may interact with established payment networks, e.g., the Automated Clearing House (ACH) to provide payment options such as ACH debits, credit or procurement card payments, and/or paper checks, which may be generated internally or by an external software module, wherein an output file in a format capable of being read by the external module may be generated. Payment by a payer system user using a credit or procurement card may also be effected, to be processed by Internet or other means. In this scenario, additional security levels may be included, e.g., for initiating credit or debit card payments and approving credit or debit card payments, and such appropriate payment-card processing functionality as may be appropriate may be included, as well.

It should also be appreciated from the outset that one or more of the functional components may alternatively be constructed out of custom, dedicated electronic hardware and/or software, without departing from the present invention. Thus, the present invention is intended to cover all such alternatives, modifications, and equivalents as may be included within the spirit and broad scope of the invention.

Unless explicitly stated otherwise, each numerical value and range should be interpreted as being approximate as if the word “about” or “approximately” preceded the value of the value or range.

It should be understood that the steps of the exemplary methods set forth herein are not necessarily required to be performed in the order described, and the order of the steps of such methods should be understood to be merely exemplary. Likewise, additional steps may be included in such methods, and certain steps may be omitted or combined, in methods consistent with various embodiments of the present invention.

Although the elements in the following method claims, if any, are recited in a particular sequence with corresponding labeling, unless the claim recitations otherwise imply a particular sequence for implementing some or all of those elements, those elements are not necessarily intended to be limited to being implemented in that particular sequence.

Reference herein to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment can be included in at least one embodiment of the invention. The appearances of the phrase “in one embodiment” in various places in the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment, nor are separate or alternative embodiments necessarily mutually exclusive of other embodiments. The same applies to the term “implementation.”

The embodiments covered by the claims in this application are limited to embodiments that (1) are enabled by this specification and (2) correspond to statutory subject matter. Non-enabled embodiments and embodiments that correspond to non-statutory subject matter are explicitly disclaimed even if they fall within the scope of the claims. 

We claim:
 1. A first-computer-implemented method for preventing the transmission of confidential information between a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer, the method comprising the steps of: (a) the first computer receiving information for performing a transaction, the information including confidential information manually entered by a user; (b) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer, wherein step (b) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); (c) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token from which the confidential information cannot be derived without knowledge of an association made by the third computer between the confidential information and the token, wherein step (c) is performed without storing, processing, or receiving from the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); and (d) the first computer sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token, wherein step (d) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the second computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS).
 2. The invention of claim 1, wherein the first computer comprises: a first software program adapted to interface with the second computer; and a second software program different from the first software program, the second software program adapted to interface with the third computer but not the second computer.
 3. The invention of claim 2, wherein: step (a) comprises: (a1) the first software program receiving the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information; and (a2) the second software program receiving the confidential information manually entered by the user; step (b) comprises the second software program sending the confidential information to the third computer; step (c) comprises the second software program receiving the token from the third computer; and step (d) comprises the first software program sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.
 4. The invention of claim 3, further comprising the second software program buffering the token in a buffer, wherein, prior to step (d), the user pastes the token from the buffer into an entry field of the first software program.
 5. The invention of claim 4, wherein the buffer is an operating-system clipboard of the first computer.
 6. The invention of claim 3, wherein substep (a2) comprises the second software program receiving the confidential information by means of the user typing the confidential information into an entry field of a window displayed by the second software program.
 7. The invention of claim 2, wherein: step (a) comprises the first software program receiving the information for performing the transaction, including the confidential information; step (b) comprises: (b1) the second software program receiving the confidential information from the first software program by inspecting an entry field of a window of the first software program that includes the confidential information; and (b2) the second software program sending the confidential information to the third computer; step (c) comprises: (c1) the second software program receiving the token from the third computer; and (c2) the second software program replacing the confidential information in the entry field of the window of the first software program with the token; and step (d) comprises the first software program sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.
 8. The invention of claim 1, wherein the first computer comprises: a software program adapted to interface with the second computer; and a packet inspector adapted (i) to receive packets from the software program, (ii) to forward the packets to the second computer, and (iii) to selectively modify one or more of the packets prior to forwarding the packets to the second computer.
 9. The invention of claim 8, wherein: step (a) comprises the software program receiving the information for performing the transaction, including the confidential information; step (b) comprises: (b1) the packet inspector receiving one or more packets of data from the software program, including the confidential information; and (b2) the packet inspector sending the confidential information to the third computer; step (c) comprises: (c1) the packet inspector receiving the token from the third computer; and (c2) the packet inspector modifying the one or more packets of data by replacing the confidential information in the one or more packets of data with the token; and step (d) comprises the packet inspector sending to the second computer the one or more modified packets of data, wherein the one or more modified packets of data include (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.
 10. The invention of claim 9, wherein the packet inspector is a dedicated hardware appliance having a processor different from a processor executing the software program.
 11. A first computer for preventing the transmission of confidential information to a second computer in communication with the first computer, the first computer adapted to: (a) receive information for performing a transaction, the information including confidential information manually entered by a user; (b) send the confidential information to a third computer, wherein step (b) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); (c) receive, from the third computer, a token from which the confidential information cannot be derived without knowledge of an association made by the third computer between the confidential information and the token, wherein step (c) is performed without storing, processing, or receiving from the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); and (d) send to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token, wherein step (d) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the second computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS).
 12. The invention of claim 11, wherein the first computer comprises: a first software program adapted to interface with the second computer; and a second software program different from the first software program, the second software program adapted to interface with the third computer but not the second computer.
 13. The invention of claim 12, wherein: step (a) comprises: (a1) the first software program receiving the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information; and (a2) the second software program receiving the confidential information manually entered by the user; step (b) comprises the second software program sending the confidential information to the third computer; step (c) comprises the second software program receiving the token from the third computer; and step (d) comprises the first software program sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.
 14. The invention of claim 13, wherein the second software program is adapted to store the token in a buffer, wherein, prior to step (d), the user pastes the token from the buffer into an entry field of the first software program.
 15. The invention of claim 14, wherein the buffer is an operating-system clipboard of the first computer.
 16. The invention of claim 13, wherein substep (a2) comprises the second software program receiving the confidential information by means of the user typing the confidential information into an entry field of a window displayed by the second software program.
 17. The invention of claim 12, wherein: step (a) comprises the first software program receiving the information for performing the transaction, including the confidential information; step (b) comprises: (b1) the second software program receiving the confidential information from the first software program by inspecting an entry field of a window of the first software program that includes the confidential information; and (b2) the second software program sending the confidential information to the third computer; step (c) comprises: (c1) the second software program receiving the token from the third computer; and (c2) the second software program replacing the confidential information in the entry field of the window of the first software program with the token; and step (d) comprises the first software program sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.
 18. The invention of claim 11, wherein the first computer comprises: a software program adapted to interface with the second computer; and a packet inspector adapted (i) to receive packets from the software program, (ii) to forward the packets to the second computer, and (iii) to selectively modify one or more of the packets prior to forwarding the packets to the second computer.
 19. The invention of claim 18, wherein: step (a) comprises the software program receiving the information for performing the transaction, including the confidential information; step (b) comprises: (b1) the packet inspector receiving one or more packets of data from the software program, including the confidential information; and (b2) the packet inspector sending the confidential information to the third computer; step (c) comprises: (c1) the packet inspector receiving the token from the third computer; and (c2) the packet inspector modifying the one or more packets of data by replacing the confidential information in the one or more packets of data with the token; and step (d) comprises the packet inspector sending to the second computer the one or more modified packets of data, wherein the one or more modified packets of data include (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token.
 20. The invention of claim 18, wherein the packet inspector is a dedicated hardware appliance having a processor different from a processor executing the software program.
 21. A non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, having encoded thereon program code, wherein, when the program code is executed by a machine, the machine implements a method for preventing the transmission of confidential information from a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer, the method comprising the steps of: (a) the first computer receiving information for performing a transaction, the information including confidential information manually entered by a user; (b) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer, wherein step (b) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); (c) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token from which the confidential information cannot be derived without knowledge of an association made by the third computer between the confidential information and the token, wherein step (c) is performed without storing, processing, or receiving from the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); and (d) the first computer sending to the second computer (i) the information for performing the transaction, except for the confidential information, and (ii) the token, wherein step (d) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the second computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS).
 22. A first-computer-implemented method for preventing the transmission of confidential information between a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer, the method comprising the steps of: (a) the first computer inspecting an entry field of a window of a software program to determine whether the entry field includes confidential information; (b) if the entry field includes confidential information, then (b1) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer, wherein substep (b1) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS), and (b2) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token from which the confidential information cannot be derived without knowledge of an association made by the third computer between the confidential information and the token, wherein substep (b2) is performed without storing, processing, or receiving from the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); and (c) the first computer replacing the confidential information in the entry field of the window of the software program with the token, wherein step (c) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the second computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS).
 23. A first-computer-implemented method for preventing the transmission of confidential information between a first computer and a second computer in communication with the first computer, the method comprising the steps of: (a) the first computer receiving one or more packets of data from the first computer; (b) the first computer inspecting the one or more packets of data to determine whether the one or more packets of data include confidential information; (c) if the one or more packets of data include confidential information, then (c1) the first computer sending the confidential information to a third computer, wherein substep (c1) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS), and (c2) the first computer receiving, from the third computer, a token from which the confidential information cannot be derived without knowledge of an association made by the third computer between the confidential information and the token, wherein substep (c2) is performed without storing, processing, or receiving from the third computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS); (d) the first computer modifying the one or more packets of data by replacing the confidential information in the one or more packets of data with the token; and (e) the first computer forwarding the one or more modified packets of data to the second computer, wherein step (e) is performed without storing, processing, or sending to the second computer any information that, in combination with the confidential information, would require the first computer to comply with any portion of the payment-card industry data-security standard (PCI DSS). 